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Abstract
To succeed in a dynamically changing world, animals need to predict their environments. Humans, in fact, exhibit such a
strong desire for consistency that one of the most well-established findings in social psychology is the effort people make to
maintain consistency among their beliefs, attitudes, and behavior. However, displeasure with unpredictability leads to a
potential paradox, because a positive outcome that exceeds one’s expectations often leads to increased subjective value
and positive affect, not the opposite. We tested the hypothesis that two evolutionarily-conserved evaluation processes
underlie goal-directed behavior: (1) consistency, concerned with prediction errors, and (2) valuation, concerned with
outcome utility. Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) viewed a food item and then were offered an identical, better, or worse
food, which they could accept or reject. The monkeys ultimately accepted all offers, attesting to the influence of the
valuation process. However, they were slower to accept the unexpected offers, and they exhibited aversive reactions,
especially to the better-than-expected offers, repeatedly turning their heads and looking away before accepting the food
item. Our findings (a) provide evidence for two separable evaluation processes in primates, consistency and value
assessment, (b) reveal a direct relationship between consistency assessment and emotional processes, and (c) show that our
wariness with events that are much better than expected is shared with other social primates.
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Introduction
To succeed in a challenging and uncertain world, animals need
to anticipate change and estimate the likelihood of possible events,
both to avoid harm (e.g., a stealthy predator) and to obtain
necessary resources that will provide more energy than is
expended acquiring them (e.g., catching prey or traveling to
distant, ephemeral resources). That is, animals need to make
predictions about their environments to determine the appropriate
course of action to reach their goals. In fact, there is substantial
evidence for the primacy of prediction in human and nonhuman
animals, showing, for example, (1) negative emotional reactions to
unpredictable events, such as unpredictable shock, with the
unpredictability and subsequent uncontrollability being a source
of neurosis and depression [1,2,3,4,5,6,7]; (2) neuronal activation
in response to novel, unpredictable and surprising events in the
amygdala, agranular insula and anterior cingulate cortex inde-
pendent of positive or negative valence [4,8,9,10]; and (3) that
learning is a function of prediction error and surprise
[11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20].
Moreover, the desire to predict accurately appears to be the
underlying reason people strive for consistency, either between
their beliefs and reality or among their own beliefs, attitudes, and
behavior (given that internal inconsistencies suggest inaccuracy).
This desire for consistency is one of the most well-established
findings in cognitive and social psychology, accounting for
multiple phenomena including cognitive dissonance (i.e., one’s
reaction to inconsistencies among one’s beliefs, attitudes, and
behavior), confirmation biases (i.e., the tendency to overweight
evidence that supports one’s current attitudes and beliefs), and the
preference for familiarity [21,22,23,24,25,26,27]. Strong evidence
for consistency theory was provided by Carlsmith and Aronson
[23] who found that after training human participants to expect a
bitter or sweet fluid based on a prior cue, then giving them the
opposite fluid, the bitter fluid tasted more bitter when expecting
the sweet fluid than when expecting the bitter one, and,
importantly, the sweet fluid tasted less sweet when expecting the
bitter one than when expecting the sweet fluid.
Some evidence for the desire for consistency has also been found
in a nonhuman primate, the tufted capuchin monkey (Cebus apella).
In a standard cognitive dissonance test, three equally preferred
items are used, where A = B = C, and subjects are forced to choose
between A and B. If A is chosen, for example, cognitive dissonance
ensues because the actual preference (A = B) does not match
choice (A.B). To resolve this dissonance, the subjective value of B
is reduced to bring preferences in line with actual choice behavior.
In the capuchin study, differently-colored M&M’sH were used
[28]. When forced to choose between two equally-preferred colors,
the capuchins later appeared to lower the value of the unchosen
color by subsequently preferring the third colored M&M over the
previously unchosen one. Thus, the capuchins appeared to
eliminate the inconsistency between their initial preferences and
their choice by devaluing the originally unchosen item. In this
general cognitive dissonance test, if all three items were initially of
equal value, the test demonstrates that preferences can be directly
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affected by actual choices. However, in practice, there is a
potential problem. If there happened to be subtle differences in
preference among the three items, choice could be based simply
on subjective value maximization and not the elimination of
cognitive dissonance [29,30].
To address this issue, a subsequent study with capuchins was
conducted, this time using differently-colored SkittlesH candies
[31]. In Condition 1, the ‘choice’ condition, each subject appeared
to be given a choice between two options when in actuality the
choice was fixed by the experimenter, a perceived ‘choice’
condition. That is, the experimenters hid two items, A1 and B1,
in front of a monkey and the subject was allowed to search for
either. Unbeknownst to the subject, however, only one, say A1,
was available to be found and thus ‘chosen’. In this way, the
experimenters could control for the actual choice and thus remove
the possibility the capuchins would always choose a color they
actually preferred. The monkeys were then given a preference test
between the ‘unchosen’ item, B1,and a novel one, C1. In
Condition 2, the ‘no choice’ condition, they were first shown
two items, A2 and B2, but were only offered A2. Note that the
acceptance of A2 in this case did not imply A2. B2 based on
choice because A2 was not chosen over B2. They were then given
the choice between B2 and C2. Finally, the percentage C1 was
chosen over B1, i.e., C1%, was compared to the percentage C2 was
chosen over B2 i.e., C2%. The extent to which C1%.C2% should
indicate the influence of cognitive dissonance, which was 60% to
49% in the study. Thus, this finding again suggests that the
capuchin monkeys may have eliminated the inconsistency between
their initial lack of preference and choice behavior by devaluing
the unchosen food item and thus preferring the novel item to bring
their preferences in line with their choices. Hence, there is some
evidence for consistency assessment in nonhuman animals with
respect to preference and choice behavior. However, it remains
unclear whether consistency is sought in other domains, most
notably, in predictions versus actual events.
Of course, animal learning as well as human judgment and
decision-making research have also established the importance of
prediction, showing that the valuation of an outcome (i.e., the
assessment of its subjective value or utility) depends on what was
expected. Consequently, for example, a positive outcome is
subjectively less positive if something better was expected: e.g.
receiving $10 when $100 was expected [32,33,34,35]. Outcome
valuation, then, produces an overall subjective value that is based
on both the objective value received and the subjective sense of
whether the outcome was a gain or loss compared to what was
expected [36,37]. Even so, the valuation process assesses outcomes
on a continuous scale, meaning that in general higher value is
better; and thus, it is useful to conceptualize the goal of the
valuation process as the maximization of subjective value (or
utility).
There is, then, an apparent contradiction between the desire for
consistency, on the one hand, and the desire to maximize
subjective value, on the other. To see this, consider, for example,
encountering a better-than-expected outcome, such as someone
unexpectedly offering to pay your restaurant dinner check. Based
on consistency theory, your reaction should be negative, given that
the outcome was not anticipated. In contrast, based on maximi-
zation of subjective value, your reaction should be positive, given
that you unexpectedly saved money.
The contradiction is reconciled if we posit that both evaluation
systems underlie goal-directed behavior: a consistency assessment
reflected in an immediate affective response based on how well a
given event or outcome was predicted [21,22,23,24,25,26,27], and
a value assessment in the subsequent affective response and action
of approaching (accepting) or avoiding (rejecting) an outcome
(offer) [13,15,32,33,34,35,38,39,40]. To date, however, evidence
for two separable processes and how they may interact remains
unclear. In humans, Shepperd and McNulty [41] tested whether,
after hearing unexpectedly good or bad news about an exam grade
or medical test, responses were best described by consistency or
valuation (e.g., utility maximization) theories, and concluded that
their evidence supported the latter. They did not, however, test
whether both processes might be working in concert, with the
consistency process responding first, revealing an initial negative
reaction to an unexpected outcome (whether positive or negative),
followed by the valuation process, producing a subsequent positive
response. Moreover, they used contexts in which valuation may
dominate a consistency assessment response, given that exam
grades and medical tests scale such that better results are much
clearly better than poorer ones [42].
In nonhuman animals, Tinklepaugh [43] found that macaque
monkeys reacted negatively when they received a lesser-valued
food item (e.g. piece of lettuce) when a higher one was expected
(e.g. piece of banana); however, he did not observe a clear
response in the reverse condition, in which the higher-valued item
was found when the lesser-valued one was expected, stating that
this latter condition needs to be further studied, and thus leaving a
distinction between consistency and valuation preferences incon-
clusive.
In the current study, we tested the hypothesis that two
evolutionarily-conserved evaluation processes underlie goal-direct-
ed behavior: one based on consistency and the other on valuation.
We reasoned that if these two processes were separable, the same
event, such as a better-than-expected offer, would lead to two
opposing reactions: an initial negative, aversive reaction reflecting
the prediction error detected by the consistency process, and a
subsequent positive reaction reflecting the positive outcome
expected by the valuation process, leading to the acceptance of
the better-than-expected offer. We tested two rhesus macaques
(Macaca mulatta) in two experiments that both included expected
offers. In addition, the first experiment included a worse-than-
expected offer and the second included a better-than-expected
one. In all cases, the monkeys accepted the offers. However, both
monkeys exhibited initial negative reactions to the unexpected
offers, and to our surprise, both monkeys exhibited the strongest
negative reaction to the better-than-expected offer.
Methods
Ethics Statement
Animal care and use complied with all current laws, regulations,
policies, and guidelines of the United States, the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Public Health Service
(PHS), and all procedures were approved by the Institutional
Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC) of Dartmouth
College.
Subjects
Two naı̈ve, seven-year old rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta),
Hamlet and Puck, were available for the study. They were housed
in 32627668 (width 6 depth 6 height) inch cages (Allentown
Inc., Allentown, NJ) in a homeroom with automatically regulated
temperature, ventilation, humidity, and lighting (14:10 hour
light:dark cycle, with lights on at 0600 hours). The monkeys were
intermittently housed in pairs and individually: at times when they
engaged in fighting, which is normal periodic behavior in young
rhesus macaque males of similar size and temperament [44], the
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two monkeys were separated and individually-housed for their
safety.
The Center for Comparative Medicine and Research (CCMR)
at Dartmouth maintains a full-time animal care and veterinary
staff that monitors the monkeys’ daily health and well-being. The
monkeys were maintained at approximately 95% of their ad libitum
weights to ensure sufficient motivation and good health, and their
diet consisted of primate chow (no. 5038, PMI Feeds Inc., St
Louis, Missouri, U.S.A.), supplemented with fresh fruit and
vegetables, as well as various treats that included peanuts, cereal,
and dried fruits (e.g., raisins, banana).
To allow for continued social stimulation, the subjects had
direct visual contact with the other monkeys in the colony, the
animal care staff, and experimenters. When pair-housed, they had
direct physical contact with each other, and also when individ-
ually-housed, through a mesh grading divider between their cages.
In addition, environmental enrichment included two or more
enrichment items in their home cages at all times, daily playing of
radio or videos in the room (the latter via a monitor mounted in
view of all individuals), and regular access to a larger enrichment
cage (68638672 inch) in an adjacent room.
We subsequently conducted an affective decision-making study
with these monkeys as well as with free-ranging rhesus monkeys at
the Caribbean Primate Research Center on Cayo Santiago in
Puerto Rico [45]. We obtained the same general findings in the
laboratory and field, suggesting that the laboratory conditions are
not significantly biasing experimental results, and that the subjects
in the current study are representative of rhesus monkeys in
general [46].
Materials and Food Items
To obtain precise response times, the study used a button panel
with two convex Plexiglas-covered buttons (approximately 16 cm
apart measured from the centers). Both buttons had lights
mounted inside of them, the left was red, the right blue. The
buttons were clear colored when not lit, red and blue, respectively,
when lit. For the preference test (described below), the buttons
were positioned just to the left and right of center. For the
remainder of the study, only the red button was used, and the
button panel was positioned with the red button in front of the
monkey. Two food items were used: a 45-mg cereal pellet (Bio-
Serv, Frenchtown, NJ, USA) and a miniature marshmallow.
General Procedure
The monkeys were brought to the testing room in the
laboratory individually in custom-made chairs. The chairs were
designed for maximal comfort and safety, in which the monkey’s
collar slid into a slot that placed the monkey in their preferred
natural sitting position, on a perch off the floor. The chair loosely
restrained the left arm of the monkey while allowing free
movement of the right arm. The monkeys were progressively
acclimated to the chairs by (a) initially having them sit near a chair
and eat treats (e.g., raisins, peanuts, fresh fruit and vegetables)
placed on it; and then (b) feeding the monkeys treats when they
were first seated in the chair. After acclimation, the monkeys
readily entered the chair; and once seated, they exhibited no signs
of stress and displayed natural behaviors such as facial expressions
and vocalizations, e.g., food grunts. For the current study, the
chairs were used to maintain precise experimental control over
food item presentation and obtain precise response time measure-
ments, with the monkey’s right hand starting at the same position
and the presented food item and button at a fixed position relative
to the monkey on every trial. Similar chairs are routinely used in
monkey neuroeconomic studies that have successfully replicated
multiple behavioral phenomena studied with other paradigms,
both in the laboratory and field [47,48].
Each monkey was tested separately, and sat across a standard
black laboratory table from the experimenter, with the button
panel placed in front of the monkey. To minimize the possible
cuing of the subjects by the experimenter, we enacted a number of
procedures, including (a) the experimenter wearing a white lab
coat, goggles, medical mask and gloves to mask visual cues; (b)
playing white noise to mask auditory cues; (c) the experimenter
following a well-practiced, timed, and stereotyped movement to
present the food items; and (d) using an automated system to
record response times. We also note that it would be unlikely that
the complex reactions exhibited by the monkeys would be due to
experimenter cuing. Finally, for all training and testing procedures
(described below), the intertrial interval was approximately ten
seconds.
Preference Test Training
Prior to the preference test, both subjects were trained with the
button panel. The experimenter turned the light on one of the
buttons (pseudo-randomly determined), placed a pellet in her
hand, closed her hand, placed it behind one of the buttons (from
the monkey’s perspective), and then opened it. The monkey was
required to press the button in front of the pellet to receive it.
Once the pellet was taken, the experimenter turned off the button
light and the intertrial interval began. This procedure was
repeated until the monkeys learned to press the button upon
receiving the offered pellet, i.e., when the experimenter opened her
hand revealing the pellet. Although these training sessions were
not recorded, both monkeys required approximately 10 sessions to
learn the task, with up to 50 trials per session.
Preference Test
For the 50-trial preference test, on every trial, the experimenter
turned on both button lights, placed one food item in each hand
(left/right position of the items pseudo-randomly determined),
closed her hands, placed them behind each button (from the
monkey’s perspective), and then opened them. The monkey chose
the preferred food item by pressing the corresponding button in
front of it. The monkey was given the chosen food item; the
experimenter then turned off both button lights and the intertrial
interval began.
General Task Description
The general task for the monkeys was to observe a single food
item for three seconds, which would potentially establish an
expectation [37], observe the food item then being removed,
observe the red light inside the button turning on to signal that the
next presented food item would be an offer, and then once the
second item was presented, press the button if the offer is accepted
(or refrain from pressing it if the offer is rejected). We denote this
trial sequence as ‘displayed food item’ followed by ‘offered food
item’: i.e., ‘displayed food itemRoffered food item’.
General Task Training Procedure
Prior to the experimental manipulations, the monkeys were
trained on the task paradigm using pellets only; and thus, with a
trial sequence ‘pelletRpellet’. The experimenter presented the first
pellet by placing her closed left hand just behind the button and
opening it in one quick motion. The pellet was presented for the
monkey to observe for three seconds to potentially establish the
expectation and then the hand was closed and pulled back. She
then turned on the red light in the button to cue the monkey of an
Monkeys React Negatively to Unexpected Offers
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impending offer, and presented the second pellet identically as the
first. The second pellet was given to the monkey upon pressing the
button. This procedure was repeated until the monkeys learned to
respond only after the red light was lit and the second pellet was
presented as the offer. Although these training sessions were not
recorded, both monkeys required approximately 10–15 sessions to
learn the task, with approximately 50 trials per session.
General Task Testing Procedure
After training was complete, the monkeys received five 50-trial
familiarization sessions, conducted on separate days, to acclimate
them further to the test paradigm, as well as to provide
standardized, baseline experience prior to conducting the two
experiments. For the first 25 trials, we again displayed a single
pellet for three seconds to establish an expectation, removed it,
and then offered an identical pellet (i.e., ‘pelletRpellet’). A monkey
accepted the second pellet by pressing the button, and we recorded
his reactions electronically via response times and video. If the
monkey did not press the button within 30 seconds, the response
was considered a rejection of the offered food item. Thus, it is
important to note that the monkeys could reject the offer by simply
not responding. For the second 25 trials, the experimenter first
displayed a marshmallow for three seconds, turned on the red light
to signify the impending offer, and then offered a marshmallow:
‘marshmallowRmarshmallow’. These trial types were tested in
two blocks of 25 trials with ‘pelletRpellet’ first to minimize the
potential influence of marshmallows on the motivation to receive
pellets (see Table 1 for the trial block structure).
An inherent difficulty in studying expectancy is that subjects
quickly adjust to the violations with experience: that is, the
unexpected becomes expected. Therefore, to minimize this effect
while also obtaining enough trials for analysis, after the five
familiarization sessions, we tested the two critical manipulations
(worse-than-expected and better-than-expected offers) in two
experiments, each conducted in single sessions on separate days.
Experiment 1 consisted of one 75-trial session. As shown in
Table 1, the session consisted of the following: (a) one block of 25
‘pelletRpellet’ trials, followed by (b) a block of 50 trials, in which
25 ‘marshmallowRmarshmallow’ trials were randomly inter-
leaved with 25 ‘marshmallowRpellet’ trials, i.e., the unexpectedly
worse offer, in which a pellet was offered after first seeing the
marshmallow. Experiment 2 consisted of one 100-trial session.
Also listed in Table 1, the session consisted of the following: (a) one
block of 25 ‘pelletRpellet’ trials, followed by (b) a block of 50
trials, with 25 ‘pelletRpellet’ trials randomly interleaved with 25
‘pelletRmarshmallow’ trials, i.e., the unexpectedly better offer, in
which a marshmallow was offered after first seeing the pellet, and
(c) a final block of 25 ‘marshmallowRmarshmallow’ trials. To
minimize the potential influence of marshmallows on motivation
to receive pellets, we conducted the 25 ‘pelletRpellet’ trials first in
all sessions, and the 25 ‘marshmallowRmarshmallow’ trials last in
Experiment 2. Thus, the first block of 25 ‘pelletRpellet’ trials in
Experiment 2 were used in the analysis.
With respect to data analysis, it has been argued that the best
procedure to manage dependent variable outliers, such as response
times, in distributions that will be compared is trimming, which
treats all conditions consistently by removing the same number of
highest and lowest values from all response time samples; we
adopted the procedure here and removed the highest five and
lowest five response times for every offer type [49,50,51]. We then
used two-tailed student’s t-tests for comparisons between offer
types. Note that after using the trimming method, the degrees of
freedom for the offer type comparisons were 15+15–2 = 28. Means
are reported with the standard error of the mean (SEM).
Results
To verify preference for the marshmallow over the pellet, we
first conducted the 50-trial preference test, and both monkeys
chose the marshmallow over the pellet every trial (two-tail
binomial test, n = 50, p,0.0001). Then, after training on the
general task, and then five familiarization sessions in which the
monkeys received a total of 125 ‘pelletRpellet’ and 125
‘marshmallowRmarshmallow’ trials (i.e., viewing a pellet followed
by a pellet offer, and viewing a marshmallow followed by a
marshmallow offer), both experiments were conducted in back-to-
back sessions on separate days. For Experiment 1, the monkeys
received three offer types: ‘pelletRpellet’, ‘marshmallowRmarsh-
mallow’, and an unexpectedly worse offer: ‘marshmallowRpellet’
(i.e., viewing a marshmallow followed by a pellet offer) (see
Table 1). As seen in the left panel of Figure 1, as expected, both
monkeys were slower to accept the unexpectedly worse offer
compared to the expected ones (see Table 2 for statistical results).
On average, both monkeys responded over twice as long to the
unexpected offer compared to the expected ones. In addition,
reflecting the monkeys’ preference for the marshmallow, the
response times were faster for the ‘marshmallowRmarshmallow’
trials than for the ‘pelletRpellet’ ones (Figure 1, Table 2).
In Experiment 2, the monkeys again received three offer types:
‘pelletRpellet’, ‘marshmallowRmarshmallow’, and an unexpect-
edly better offer: ‘pelletRmarshmallow’ (i.e., viewing a pellet
followed by a marshmallow offer) (Table 1). As seen in the right
panel of Figure 1, rather than responding faster to the
unexpectedly better offer, both monkeys were slower to accept it
(see Table 2 for statistical results). On average, Hamlet responded
over eight times slower compared to the expected offers, and Puck
responded approximately five times slower. Again, reflecting
preference for the marshmallow, both monkeys’ response times
were faster for the ‘marshmallowRmarshmallow’ trials than for
the ‘pelletRpellet’ ones, although the difference was significant for
Hamlet only (Figure 1, Table 2).
Comparing the responses to the two unexpected offer types,
‘marshmallowRpellet’ and ‘pelletRmarshmallow’ from Experi-
ments 1 and 2, respectively, the delay to accept the better-than-
expected offer was significantly longer than for the worse-than-
expected one, being over three and a half times longer for Hamlet
and almost twice as long for Puck (see Figure 1 and Table 2). If the
longer delay to accept the better-than-expected offer reflected
surprise, excitation, or the need to process the large, positive
reward change, we would expect the monkeys to look longer at the
unexpected food item, as shown with looking-time paradigms,
which are predicated on the fact that humans, including infants
and children, as well as nonhuman animals tend to look longer at
unexpected, surprising events [52,53,54,55]. In contrast, our
monkeys did not look longer at the better-than-expected offers. In
fact, they did the opposite, conspicuously averting their eyes and
turning away from the unexpectedly better food item (the
marshmallow). To obtain the clearest and most conservative
measure of this response, we video coded simultaneous head and
eye aversions: that is, both (a) the head was turned, and (b) the
monkey was not looking at the food item. Two people scored the
videos on all conducted trials, one experimentally blind, with a
lowest correlation between them of Pearson’s r(148) = 0.99,
p,0.0001. Then, we used the trials in the response-time analyses
(i.e., after trimming, described in Methods) to obtain the
percentage of time on every trial that the monkeys were averting
their head and eyes before responding to the offer. We took the
total aversion time on the trial (i.e., amount of time simultaneously
turned and looking away) and divided it by the total response time
Monkeys React Negatively to Unexpected Offers
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for the trial (between offer and button press) and multiplied by
100. Finally, to obtain the overall percentage for each condition,
we took the average percentage of all trials used in the analyses.
First, there were no aversions in either experiment for any of the
expected offers: i.e., ‘pelletRpellet’ or ‘marshmallowRmarshmal-
low’. Second, both monkeys exhibited aversions to both
unexpected offer types: for ‘marshmallowRpellet’ in Experiment
1, Hamlet 965% and Puck 363% of the time; for ‘pelletR
marshmallow’ in Experiment 2, Hamlet 8162% and Puck
2368% of the time. For Experiment 1, Hamlet’s aversion rate
to the unexpected offer (‘marshmallowRpellet’) was significantly
higher compared to the expected ones (t(28) = 2.08, p,0.05);
however, Puck’s was not. For Experiment 2, both monkeys’
aversion rates to the unexpected offer (‘pelletRmarshmallow’)
were significantly higher compared to the expected ones (Hamlet:
t(28) = 41.49, p,0.0001; Puck: t(28) = 2.97, p,0.01). Third, both
monkeys exhibited higher aversion rates to the better-than-
expected food item compared to the worse-than-expected one
(Hamlet: t(28) = 14.56, p,0.0001; Puck: t(28) = 2.46, p,0.05), with
Hamlet’s rate being nine times higher with the better-than-
expected food item and Puck’s over seven and a half times higher.
Finally, by definition, the unexpected events should become less
surprising with increased exposure, and we found some evidence
for this within the session. In Experiment 1, both monkeys’
response times to accept the unexpected offer (‘marshmallowR
pellet’) decreased across the session (Linear regression, Hamlet:
R(14) = 0.88, p,0.0001; Puck: R(14) = 0.68, p,0.01). In addition,
in Experiment 2, Hamlet’s response times to accept the
unexpected offer (‘pelletRmarshmallow’) decreased across the
session (Linear regression, R(14) = 0.70, p,0.01). The only other
offer type showing a change across trials was a decrease in
response times for Hamlet in the Experiment 1 ‘pelletRpellet’
trials (Linear regression, R(14) = 0.58, p,0.05). The only change
across trials in the video coded aversion rates occurred for Hamlet
Table 1. Block sequence for the Familiarization condition (five consecutive sessions) and Experiments 1 and 2 (one session each),
and within the condition and experiments, the trial block offer types and number of trials.
Block Familiarization Condition
Number
of Trials Experiment 1
Number
of Trials Experiment 2
Number
of Trials
1 Pellet R Pellet 25 Pellet R Pellet 25 Pellet R Pellet 25
2 Marshmallow R Marshmallow 25 Marshmallow R Marshmallow 25 Pellet R Pellet 25
interleaved with interleaved with
Marshmallow R Pellet 25 Pellet R Marshmallow 25
3 Marshmallow R Marshmallow 25
A daily session for each monkey consisted of either the two blocks of the Familiarization Condition, the two blocks of Experiment 1, or the three blocks of Experiment 2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0075768.t001
Figure 1. The average response time (ms) from the presentation to the acceptance of the offered food item for each offer type for
both monkeys. Results shown for two-tailed student’s t test, ‘*’ = p,0.05, ‘**’ = p,0.01, ‘***’ = p,0.001, ‘****’ = p,0.0001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0075768.g001
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in the Experiment 1 unexpected offer (‘marshmallowRpellet’)
(Linear regression, R(14) = 0.73, p,0.01). Thus, the simultaneous
head and eye aversions of both monkeys for the better-than-
expected offer (‘pelletRmarshmallow’) in Experiment 2 were
generally sustained across the session.
Discussion
In Experiment 1, as expected, both monkeys were slower to
accept the unexpectedly worse offer (‘marshmallowRpellet’)
compared to the expected ones. This finding is consistent with
evidence that outcome evaluation by humans and nonhuman
animals is affected by how the problem scenario is framed
[34,36,37,56]. Thus, the first presented food item, such as the
marshmallow, appeared to become a reference to the monkeys,
which then was used to evaluate the subsequently offered item,
such as the pellet. However, from the results of Experiment 1, it
remains unclear whether the increased response time reflected a
single evaluation process underlying goal-directed behavior or
whether there was more than one, in particular, consistency and
value assessment. Put differently, it is at this point unclear whether
the increased response time was due to the devaluation of the
second food item or surprise and potential cognitive dissonance.
In Experiment 29s key offer type, we first displayed a pellet to
the monkeys but then offered a marshmallow. Given that in
Experiment 1 they were faster to accept a marshmallow when
offered one in the ‘marshmallowRmarshmallow’ trials compared
to the other offer types, one might have expected a similar result or
even a faster response to the better-than-expected offer. Assuming
that response time reflects expected value (and there is no floor
effect with the monkeys already reaching as quickly as they can in
the ‘marshmallowRmarshmallow’ trials), a faster response time
would be predicted by standard valuation theories (e.g., utility
maximization); and in any case, standard valuation theories would
not predict a slower response time. Additional factors that could
have led to a faster response to the better-than-expected offer
include heightened arousal and an increased influence of lower-
level prepotent mechanisms causing an immediate reach to the
desired food item [57,58,59,60,61,62,63,64]. However, the oppo-
site occurred in that both monkeys were much slower to accept the
marshmallow after first seeing a pellet as compared to the expected
offers (i.e., compared to ‘pelletRpellet’ and ‘marshmallowR
marshmallow’).
Not only did both monkeys respond more slowly to both the
better- and worse-than-expected offers than to the expected ones,
they responded even more slowly to the better-than-expected offer
than to the worse-than-expected one. One possible reason for the
longer response times for the ‘pelletRmarshmallow’ offer type
(Experiment 2) versus the ‘marshmallowRpellet’ one (Experiment
1) could be context effects, regarding how their experience might
have affected expectations differently for the two unexpected offer
types. One potential context effect is whether the monkeys were
faster to accept the pellet offer in the ‘marshmallowRpellet’ trials
compared to the marshmallow offer in the ‘pelletRmarshmallow’
trials because they had more experience responding to the pellet
(especially in initial training and the first blocks of Experiments 1
and 2). However, even with this extra experience, both monkeys
were generally faster to respond to the marshmallow in the
‘marshmallowRmarshmallow’ trials; therefore, experience with
accepting particular offers did not appear to influence their
behavior substantially.
A second potential context effect regards the food item
displayed prior to the offered item. More experience with ‘pelletR
pellet’ trials could have led to the displayed pellet becoming a
stronger predictor of the subsequent pellet offer (i.e., a stronger
discriminative stimulus) compared to the strength of the marsh-
mallow predicting an offered marshmallow. If so, a pellet followed
by a marshmallow could have been more surprising, leading to a
longer response time. At the same time, we note that it was also
possible that prior experience could have had the opposite effect
on ‘pelletRmarshmallow’ trials, with the monkeys learning prior
to Experiment 2 that different combinations of presented and
offered items were possible and thus less surprising (having
experienced ‘pelletR pellet’, ‘marshmallowRmarshmallow’ and
‘marshmallowRpellet’). Nonetheless, context effects could have
contributed to longer response times with the ‘pelletRmarshmal-
low’ offer type; and it will be important in the future to
characterize how experience and other contexts effects contribute
to such expectation development. As we discuss below, it is also
Table 2. Results obtained for all offer types in Experiments 1 and 2, including response times (mean 6 SEM), and student’s t test
and p values for each offer type comparison.
Experiment 1 Experiment 2

















Marshmallow R Pellet 10166110 4.64 10776121 4.8
Pellet R Pellet 501617 0.0001 486624 0.0001
Marshmallow R Pellet 10166110 5.29 10776121 5.89
Marshmallow R Marshmallow 43369 0.0001 36467 0.0001
Marshmallow R Marshmallow 43369 3.55 36467 4.89 38667 3.08 39468 1.29
Pellet R Pellet 501617 0.01 486624 0.0001 426610 0.01 412612 ns
Pellet R Marshmallow 36116296 10.75 20496395 4.14
Pellet R Pellet 426610 0.0001 412612 0.001
Pellet R Marshmallow 36116296 10.89 20496395 4.19
Marshmallow R Marshmallow 38667 0.0001 39468 0.001
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0075768.t002
Monkeys React Negatively to Unexpected Offers
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 October 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 10 | e75768
possible that monkeys generally have less experience with better-
than-expected outcomes compared to worse-than-expected ones.
However, the main objective of the current study was to
determine if any context effects could be demonstrated in rhesus
monkeys by setting up potential expectations in both worse-than-
expected and better-than-expected directions. The results show
that this objective was achieved. In both experiments, the response
times of the unexpected offers for both monkeys were significantly
different from the expected ones. Although the longer response
time to the worse-than-expected offer of a pellet following a
marshmallow was anticipated, the underlying reasons for the
longer response time to the better-than-expected offer of a
marshmallow following a pellet are less clear.
If the longer delay to accept the better-than-expected offer
reflected surprise, excitation, or the need to process the large,
positive reward change, the monkeys should have looked longer at
the unexpected food item, as shown with numerous studies that
used the ‘looking-time’ paradigm, in which subjects look longer at
unexpected, surprising events [52,53,54,55]. Not only was the
marshmallow following the displayed pellet potentially surprising,
it might also have produced a positively-valenced affective
reaction, which should have focused attention further on the
unexpected ‘jackpot’ or ‘prize’. In contrast, our monkeys
conspicuously averted their eyes and turned away from the
unexpectedly better food item (the marshmallow).
What could have caused the increase in the aversion rate (i.e.,
percentage of time simultaneously turning their heads and looking
away from the marshmallow)? Three possible reasons for turning
away from the better-than-expected food item are (1) disinterest,
(2) the loss of experimental control of their behavior in a novel
situation, or (3) active avoidance of the food item. The first,
disinterest, is unlikely given (a) that the monkeys were maintained
at 95% ad libitum weight to assure sufficient motivation; (b) the
generally faster response times with the more highly-preferred food
item throughout the experiment (i.e., the ‘marshmallowRmarsh-
mallow’ trials); and (c) that neither monkey looked away from the
offered food items on the ‘expected’ trials. Thus, the monkeys
exhibited interest in the food items and were not simply
responding independent of them, for example, based on habit
[40,65]. The second possibility, the loss of experimental control,
could occur if the posed problem was sufficiently novel from what
they had learned. The novel offer of the marshmallow following
the pellet might have left them simply confused, which might have
resulted in looking around, being uncertain of what to do. We find
this possibility unlikely given that they had extensive training with
the task structure, with the red light and second food item
signifying an offer. Although it is possible that they could not
generalize from the ‘pelletR pellet’, ‘marshmallowRmarshmal-
low’, and ‘marshmallowRpellet’ trials, it seems less likely given
that they readily generalized from the ‘pelletR pellet’ training to
the ‘marshmallowRmarshmallow’ trials (first familiarization
session response times on the ‘marshmallowRmarshmallow’ trials:
Hamlet, 624640 ms; Puck, 38365 ms, which were both over five
times faster than for the better-than-expected ‘pelletRmarshmal-
low’ trials). In addition, if the monkeys did not know what to do,
they should not have eventually accepted the offers by pressing the
button within a few seconds and should not have subsequently
reached toward the experimenter’s hand to obtain the marshmal-
low, which they both did, appearing to reflect an understanding of
the general task structure. Finally, even with a loss of experimental
control of their behavior, it seems unlikely that they would look
away from the marshmallow, experimenter, and experimental
apparatus, given that, in general, there were blank walls to their
left and right (and behind them).
We are therefore left with the possibility that the monkeys were
actively avoiding the unexpected food items, and in particular, the
marshmallow. First, head and eye aversions are a telltale aversive
response in rhesus monkeys [44,66,67]. Second, the behavior we
observed is comparable to that found in affective neuroscience
with ‘fear’ tests, in which, for example, monkeys must reach across
a transparent box to obtain a desired food item at the back of the
top of the box. Inside the transparent box is a fake spider or snake
that the monkeys must reach over. Indicators of the emotional fear
response to the spider or snake are eye aversions and head turning,
which we adopted here [66,67]. Thus, it appears that both
monkeys in our study exhibited a negative reaction to the
unexpected food items, and in particular, to the better-than-
expected marshmallow. This finding was especially strong with
Hamlet when confronted with the better-than-expected marsh-
mallow, in which he turned away from it for long periods of time
(over 80% of the time prior to accepting it). Although there is
evidence in nonhuman animals for positive and negative contrast
effects [68,69,70,71,72], frustration or disappointment
[43,73,74,75,76], and surprise [8,11,16,18,19,76], to our knowl-
edge, this is the first report of nonhuman animals displaying overt
negative affect in response to a better-than-expected event.
Although both monkeys reacted negatively to the unexpected
outcomes, they, nonetheless, eventually accepted the offers by
pressing the button, rather than rejecting them by not pressing the
button. One possible explanation for their eventual acceptance of
the unexpected offers is if the monkeys pressed the button
independent of the offer, for example, as a means to proceed to the
next trial or as an automatic habitual response. However, given
that the food items were taken and eaten immediately makes this
possibility unlikely. In addition, the faster response times to the
more preferred marshmallow (in the ‘marshmallowRmarshmal-
low’ trials) than the less-preferred pellets (in the ‘pelletRpellet’
trials), even though they had more experience with ‘pelletRpellet’
trials, also suggest that their behavior was goal-directed, based on
the offer value. We take this dichotomy of reactions–initially
reacting negatively by looking away and taking longer to respond,
but nonetheless eventually accepting the offer and consuming it–as
evidence for two processes underlying goal-directed behavior: one
based on consistency assessment and the other based on value
assessment. Moreover, our results suggest that the consistency
process may occur prior to the valuation process, such that
individuals compare their expectation to the actual event, and then
first react negatively to error (and adjust their expectations),
reflecting consistency assessment, and then react positively (if
better than expected), reflecting valuation of the expected
outcome. Evidence for these two underlying evaluation processes,
one based on consistency, the other on value, may not be
surprising, given the large literatures supporting each one (as
discussed in the introduction)
[1,3,4,5,12,13,15,17,18,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,31,43]. However,
to our knowledge, this is also the first demonstration of the
interrelationship of both processes, at least in a nonhuman animal.
Our finding of an aversive reaction to unexpected events also
provides evidence for a direct relationship between consistency
and emotional processes in the brain, which presumably motivate
animals, including humans, to actively minimize the cognitive
dissonance of expectancy violations, either via avoiding these
contingencies or learning to anticipate them in the future
[25,38,39,43,77,78,79,80,81,82]. Moreover, evidence for a sepa-
rable consistency process and its relationship to emotion provides
support for the contention that there are monitoring processes in
the brain, for example, to alert higher-level systems to override
lower-level ones [4,8,9,10,83,84,85,86,87]. For instance, if our
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monkeys had developed a basic routine to some degree to perform
the task, an unanticipated change in the routine could have led a
consistency-based monitoring system to generate an alarm signal,
as reflected in the negatively-valenced emotional response. This
signal could activate other processes, such as higher-level ones, to
assess the problem. For example, self-regulation could be applied
until it is determined that the valuation system can proceed [88].
In any case, a consideration of consistency and value assessment as
separable processes should help clarify complex reactions such as
surprise, given that the valence of the reaction (i.e., whether positive
or negative) to expectancy violation should depend on the timing
and relative strengths of the underlying processes
[4,8,23,32,89,90].
Although we found evidence for the existence of both evaluation
processes underlying rhesus monkey goal-directed behavior in
both of our subjects, further studies will need to test more
individuals to determine the extent to which rhesus macaques in
general exhibit responses that reflect a desire for both consistency
and positive subjective value. Our study has shown that at least
some individual monkeys do, and thus these processes coexist in at
least some rhesus macaques. Although we obtained consistent
results with both monkeys, one might expect to find individual
differences in the relative weighting of the influence of these
processes, with some individuals preferring consistency, routine,
and exploitation of what is known, and others preferring novelty
and exploration to find potentially richer payoffs. For macaque
monkeys, this consistency versus novelty seeking distinction may
correlate with factors like dominance rank, age, and gender, and
may be significantly heritable, given that these general dispositions
have a significant genetic component in humans [91,92].
Future work will also need to clarify the specific conditions
under which these effects are elicited. Indeed, different contexts
will likely influence the relative weighting of the two processes, as is
likely the case with people. Nonetheless, our study has revealed
that there are conditions under which both consistency assessment
and subjective valuation are manifest in the goal-directed behavior
of rhesus macaques.
The negative response of the monkeys to the unexpected events,
especially the better-than-expected one, appears to reflect their
inexperience with such situations and the resulting discomfort
when expectations are violated
[1,3,4,5,12,13,15,17,18,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,31,43]. Interest-
ingly, in instances in which the outcome is highly unexpected,
skepticism may in fact be warranted. Better-than-expected events
in particular may be a rarer occurrence, especially in a social
environment in which self-regulation may be the norm for most
individuals to protect against conflict, severe punishment, and
deception. The sentiment that something is too good to be true may
reflect this inherent wariness or skepticism with large prediction
discrepancies in the positive direction [23,93,94]. Although this
phenomenon is firmly ensconced in popular culture, little is known
about the conditions under which an expectancy violation may
lead to concerns and wariness about the actual outcome. Here, we
have found evidence that the concern people have with events that
are much better-than-expected is shared with at least one other
social primate. Furthermore, our results suggest that a ‘too good to
be true’ effect is not a devaluation of the potential outcome, but
rather, a reflection of the primacy of the consistency process
whereby one compares the current offer to what is expected.
Valuation is then halted while a further evaluation of the situation
is made.
Some nonhuman primates have been shown to turn down offers
when another individual receives a better one [95,96], or when
offered something better than a social partner [96]. By the same
token, some primate species have also demonstrated altruistic acts
in which they help others [97,98], even at some cost to themselves
[99,100,101]. These instances, together with our findings,
demonstrate socio-cognitive processes that interact with the
general tendency to maximize value, attesting to the complex
contingencies of living in a social world [102,103]. In fact, the
separable process of prediction-based consistency detection and
management may be a precursor to more sophisticated higher-
order cognitive abilities, including self-regulation, model-based
planning and mental simulation, deception detection, and social
contract management [20,21,24,26,27,34,102,103,104,105,106].
The finding that both of our rhesus monkeys exhibited a
preference for consistency between what is expected and what is
experienced may also have clinical relevance, especially when
preference for constancy, routine, and ritual becomes extreme, as
observed in obsessive compulsive disorder [107] and the insistence
on sameness in autism spectrum disorder [108,109,110]. An
understanding of the evolutionarily-conserved cognitive and
affective mechanisms underlying expectancy violations could
account for some of these symptoms. It is indeed likely that there
was strong selection pressure on social primates to minimize
unpredictability in a complex, dynamic, and uncertain world, and
to remain vigilant with events that are worse than expected or
others that may be too good to be true.
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